Inside an enclave: the dynamics of capitalism and rural politics in a post-land reform context

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ABSTRACT
There is no doubt that Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Program resulted in repeasantization. As several studies point out, it also resulted in accumulation from below by a majority of the resettled peasantry. Our study focuses on an area where counter-agrarian reform is in motion and accumulation from below is constrained. In this location, we argue that repeasantization is severely being contested as indicated by the re-emergence of a dual-mode of production and the subsequent ‘virtual’ dispossession and proletarianization of the land reform beneficiaries. Our findings shed more light on the dynamics of capitalism and agrarian politics in a context where land reforms are implemented under neoliberalism. In this enclave, peasants after accessing land through the land reform collectivized their land and parcelled it to the downsized and nearby capitalist farming system. The capitalist farming system engages in spatio-temporal fix by moving from one rural site to another as it follows the dictates of accumulation. While the possibility of full-scale land dispossession exists, the current state ownership of land and the peasantry’s resistance provided some brakes to full-scale land dispossession. At the same time, the state’s limited support to land reform beneficiaries fuels this localized land dispossession. The peasantry’s exploitation in this enclave ranges from corvee labor to coercion into the mini-land enclosures; these are implemented by village heads, who are local state functionaries. This study also recasts the relevance of the Marxist framework in understanding rural dynamics more specifically; it revisits Karl Kautsky’s arguments on the coexistence thesis of the peasantry and capitalist farming and illustrates the Zimbabwean state’s ambivalence with regards to the conditions of peasant and capitalist farming.

KEYWORDS
Capitalism; dispossession; peasant farming; capitalist farming; semi-proletariat; land reform

Introduction
There is no doubt that Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTRLP) implemented in 2000 resulted in massive repeasantization and reconfiguration of the country’s economy and the agrarian structure (Moyo and Yeros 2005). This repeasantization undoubtedly reversed the land exploitation that persisted from colonial times (Moyo 2013; Moyo and Yeros 2005; Mutopo, Manjengwa, and Chiweshe 2014). The agrarian reconfiguration is indicated by the new 145,000 peasant households (A1 1) and the...
16,500 middle to large farm beneficiaries (A2\textsuperscript{2}) (Moyo 2003). Land ownership was reconfigured and the present structure is dominated by smallholder farmers (Zamchiya 2011). Some scholars have reported this as the emergence of a trimodal agrarian structure that is characterized by the presence of the peasantry, middle to large farms, agro and industrial estates (Moyo 2011a; Moyo and Nyoni 2013; Chambati 2017; Sakata 2016). Conversely, some argue that this was a reconfiguration of the agrarian structure in racial terms only; there is still the dominance of the dual structure, albeit one dominated by the black farmers (Zamchiya 2011). However, both the trimodal and bimodal structures are recognized, though the trimodal is more dominant than the dual-mode (Moyo 2013; Scoones et al. 2012; Chambati 2011).

Prior to the land reform, a dual-mode of production existed. This mode of production was manifested by the dominance of 4500 Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCF\textsuperscript{3}) that owned the majority of the fertile land, with the peasantry holding infertile land as well as acting as the labor production site for the LSCF (Moyo 2003). The fast track land reform altered this dual mode of production. In the post-land reform era, there are about 200 white-owned farms occupying 117,000 ha (Scoones et al. 2011). Currently, A2 commercial farming units and LSCF together have 12% of land area (Mudhara 2004). Previously, the LSCF had 30% of land area (Mudhara 2004). Some of the former LSCF moved to other countries, such as Zambia, South Africa, and Mozambique. As in the pre-land reform era, the remaining LSCF mainly concentrate on export products such as tobacco, wildlife and horticultural products (Moyo 1995, 150). The new resettlement areas are widely recognized as new sites of accumulation from below. It is highlighted that these areas are ‘not replicas of what is gone before’ (Scoones et al. 2012, 522). However, caution is suggested, and there is need to continue researching if dualism would be reimposed (p. 522).

The FTRLP widely altered labor relations as the formerly landless peasants that used to sell their labor to capitalist farmers became a class of landowners (Chambati 2011). At the same time, proletarianization was not fully abolished. Some land beneficiaries still sell their labor, and the dual structure still persists, albeit in limited locations (Chambati 2011). The capitalist farmers whose land was not expropriated and those who had their land downsized were left on the land putatively to produce fuel, exports, and wildlife (Moyo 2011a). Such LSCF use labor from usual farm workers, and some of the labor is provided by the resettled peasants. The locations where such LSCF are situated are characterized by dualism, the prevalence of super-exploitation and acute socio-economic differentiation (see Shivji 2009). These areas are ‘enclaves of accumulation from above’ and remnants of the colonial grab (Moyo 2011a, 261). Some farms in Marondera District are located in one of such enclaves. The present article focuses on three farms in Marondera District, herein called an enclave. The area is an enclave since several studies on Zimbabwe’s land reform report to a large degree the existence of a trimodal structure and accumulation from below by the peasantry (Scoones et al. 2011, 2012, 2017; Moyo et al. 2009), but in this location there is the existence of a bimodal structure that is hinged on the exploitation of the peasantry by large scale farming and constrained accumulation from below. In this enclave the land reform temporarily altered the agrarian structure from a bimodal to a trimodal one as will be argued and demonstrated by this article. After the

\textsuperscript{2}A2: middle to large scale landholdings from 6 ha up to 1500 ha depending on the agro-ecological zone.

\textsuperscript{3}LSCF in this article also refers to Large Scale Capitalist Farm.
land reform the peasants in this location collectivized\(^4\) their land and parceled it to the LSCF in exchange for land rent. While one may view this as a purely market-based transaction of land renting, Marx forewarned us that capitalism ‘appears’ to be a rational and fair economic transaction, but our role is to look beneath the surface. Beneath this land renting is the tendency of capitalism of land concentration and centralization. The unification of separate minor capital and centralization of land is a hallmark of capitalism (Kautsky [1899] 1988).

According to Zimbabwean law, land renting without the consent of the Minister of Agriculture, Lands and Rural Resettlement is illegal (See Statutory Instrument (SI) 53 of 2014). However, this article is not meant to investigate the legality of this practice on the three farms in Marondera. Our focus is on the dynamics of capitalism and agrarian politics in this locality as a result of the dispossession of land from the peasantry. It is highlighted that land renting has also fueled the rise in land concentration and the emergence of unequal land and labor relations (Moyo 2013). Thus in this enclave land reform can better be described as ‘transition without transformation’ (Burawoy quoted in Mamonova 2016). In this enclave, after losing land access and control, peasants are turned into a ‘landless’ proletariat for the LSCF. Yet at the same time, land access is integral to rural development in the countryside as it provides the most critical resource for subsistence (Akram-Lodhi 2007a). In the post-land reform period, not all the land reform beneficiaries have been able to accumulate. For accumulation to occur there is the need for the provision of other supporting resources, such as access to markets and agrarian finance, in essence; more access to land does not mean access to the best conditions of production (Amin 2010). The re-emergence of dualism in the post-land reform era has taken variegated manifestations. It is highlighted that ‘new alliances’ are being formed between former white farmers and black landed elites (Scoones et al. 2012). Furthermore, the emergence of subletting and informal land markets are due to speculative reasons, precarious livelihoods and the need to maximize incomes from agriculture and overcome ‘deep-seated’ production challenges (Moyo 2013; Matondi 2012; Murisa 2011; Sachikonye 2016; Marongwe 2011, 1070). Studies report that by the year 2009, about 25% of land reform beneficiaries rented out land to various actors including former landowners (Moyo et al. 2009).

The re-establishment of dualism, which is counter agrarian reform, is not only particular to Zimbabwe; in an in-depth doctoral study on the Russian countryside Mamonova (2016) terms this the ‘Russian Paradox’. It is a paradox in that the peasant landowner leases out his /her land and becomes a proletariat. Under such circumstances, there is no separation or displacement from the land (Mamonova 2016). Whilst Mamonova argues that there is no separation from the land, this article argues that there is ‘virtual’ separation from the land. During the land leasing the peasant farmer does not have access to the land. Virtual dispossession can illustrate ephemeral but substantive separation from the means of production (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010a). Similarly, Shivji (2009) while writing on land reforms forewarns that in situations where land reforms fail to alter the landholding structure, accumulation from below will be constrained and a comprador path dominated by

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\(^4\)Collectivization refers to a joint action by the peasantry, involving pooling their plots together to form one or several land blocks that are handed over to the LSCF. When the collectivization started it was voluntary; but as the practice became entrenched, there is use of coercion and persuasion by the village leadership and ‘collectivization committees’ as discussed in this article.
yeomanry will emerge. That is, some land reforms will dispossess landowners the profits only (Amin 2010, 118; see Neocosmos 1986). The situation in Marondera is a scenario where the landowner bloc is temporarily dispossessed by the land reform but mobilizes and embarks on land reconcentration.

To have a better understanding of the capitalist trajectories in Marondera, the study makes use of a Marxist political economy approach. Thus, focus is given to the interaction of social, political and economic processes (Sender and Smith 1986). Marxism is pertinent to this study since it leads to conceptual abstractions and empirical observations and at the same time ‘offers powerful insights into agrarian change and politics in the 21st century’ (Scoones et al. 2012; Levien, Watts, and Hairong 2018). Regarding the study of rural dynamics in the current neoliberal epoch, several scholars have posed critical questions. Byres (1986, 1991) posits as follows: ‘Why does the capitalist mode of production despite the dominance attributed to it co-exist with a pre-capital social relation of production, what is the effect of the coexistence on the social formations?’ Similarly, Hall et al. (2015, 475) argue that more analysis is needed about how and why rural people engage with capitalism: who, how, why and on what terms? Also, Shivji (2009, 78) with regards to post-land reform trajectory asks, ‘what would be the trajectory of accumulation after land redistribution and the creation of a small peasantry where the ultimate title and control of land is vested in the State?’ Concurringly, Levien, Watts, and Hairong (2018) highlight that there is a critical need for deeper analysis of the social forces that configure accumulation, social reproduction, and political struggles. Drawing from the preceding themes and questions, this study seeks to answer the following questions:

(1) What are the dynamics of capitalism in a post-land reform context characterized by the re-emergence of dualism?
(2) How do peasants and capitalism co-exist and what social formations arise out of such co-existence?

The ultimate goal of this study is to deepen our understanding of the agrarian changes that occur in enclaves (areas where the FTRLP did not alter the dualism or rather temporarily altered it). In this vein, the study aims to contribute to the debate on the dynamics of capitalism in post-land reform Zimbabwe and to debates on land reform in neoliberal contexts.

**Capitalism and agrarian politics**

The capitalistic logic manifests itself in the form of a trilateral relationship between the state, capital and the peasant (Shivji 2009, 68). In Africa, imperialism marked the exacerbation of capitalism. This epoch was marked by stripping of assets by colonial powers and physical, legal and political coercion of indigenous Africans (Moyo and Kawewe 2002). Land ownership and control was tilted in favor of a white minority (Sender and Smith 1986), although this tendency of capitalistic encroachment and plunder was somehow similar in Africa, Southern Africa had a particular tendency of settler colonialism. Under settler colonialism, Africans were pushed into reserves, while fertile lands were occupied by the minority white (Wolpe 1972). Resultantly, in the countryside, a dual mode of agriculture emerged. This dual-mode of agriculture was based on large-
scale capitalistic farming that dominated the international and domestic market and poorer reserves and communal areas where the majority lived as sources of cheap labor. Additionally, African males provided cheap labor for the mines and industry (Wolpe 1972; Mafeje 1978 cited in Jacobs 2018). Thus, an understanding of the trajectory of dualism that prevailed in settler colonial Africa aids our appreciation of the dualism in Marondera, albeit a marginally contested one. Despite the fact that three farms in Marondera do not fully resemble the colonial reserves, they do have a resemblance to communal areas, as shown by the prevalence of the peasantry and traditional authorities; also some of the land reform beneficiaries were drawn from the communal lands (Matondi 2012).

However, Wolpe’s (1972) presentation of proletarianization is challenged; it fails to explain the differentiation within the peasantry, obscures the agency of the peasantry, and ignores the fact that wages could be used for subsidizing petty commodity production (Neocosmos 1990; Levin and Neocosmos 1989, 238–239). Furthermore, in colonial times, even in the present-day, the rate of proletarianization differed from one region to another, and in some cases, the peasantry accumulated from below, thereby debunking the linear proletarianization thesis that treated the peasantry as a homogenous group (Phimister cited in Neocosmos 1990; Shivji 2009, 70). These varying ontologies on proletarianization provide critical lenses in interpreting the proletarianization processes in the enclave where the peasantry is differentiated.

As for the state, it became dominated by imperial powers that put in place policies that favored large scale farming and, at times, legalized indigenous activities, such as beer brewing (Wolpe 1972; Moyo and Kawewe 2002). The state directly promoted this bimodal agrarian structure by providing dams, loans, and subsidies to the large estates that were mainly owned by South African and British capitalists (Moyo and Chambati 2013). Consequently, peasant accumulation from below was stunted and more precarity enforced. Simultaneously, force and extra-economic coercion were used to compel the peasant into commodity production (Martiniello 2015). Also, there was the growth of the mining and industrial sectors. These were white-minority owned (Moyo 2011b). The labor force for these sectors relied on the reserves and communal areas for its social reproduction (Wolpe 1972; Yeros 2002). Thus, this disarticulated economy led to the rise of worker-peasant households (Wolpe 1972; Moyo 2011b; Yeros 2002). In essence, colonialism disconnected the peasantry from the land, fueled migrant labor and the acuteness of a bimodal agrarian structure that was hinged on a polarity of accumulation and exploitation. Within capitalism, the historicity of migrant labor is well noted (Byres 1996). In southern Africa, the colonial state’s displacement of the peasantry from the land exacerbated the semi-proletarianization as the peasants were converted into a wage class that provided cheaper labor in the mines and industry with limited access to land (Yeros 2002; Moyo 2011b). The land-dispossessed peasantry was left with little means for social reproduction and, therefore, had to seek employment in the urban areas. Hence, land dispossession was central to the evolution of semi-proletarianization even to the present day, as shown in the Marondera case study where the land dispossession of the peasantry has led to the rise of semi-proletarianization.

In post-independent Zimbabwe, the FTRLP challenged the dominance of the bimodal structure (Moyo and Chambati 2013). Resultantly, a trimodal structure emerged (Moyo and Nyoni 2013). However, as Marx pointed out, capitalism is mysterious. The era of neoliberal
globalization has brought many dynamics in the patterns of accumulation (Borras 2009). These dynamics, among others, include contract farming, financialisation of capitalism, outgrower schemes, land grabs, frontiers and enclosures (Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017; Shivji 2009; Peluso and Lund 2011). It is argued that these new forms of capitalistic accumulation indicate a scramble for resources and are triggered by the rise of flex crops, which in essence reflect the need for endless accumulation by capital (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros 2013; Borras, Franco, and Monsalve Suarez 2015). However, we are also cautioned that in other contexts land grabs can be propelled by conflicts over race, religion or caste (Adnan 2013). Such capitalistic encroachments bring in new actors, new crops and new labor processes around land control (Peluso and Lund 2011). But in every sense, this typifies counter agrarian reform (Akram-Lodhi 2015). It is counter agrarian in the sense that large scale farming results in the centralization and concentration of land. Such accumulation of land is achieved via land rentals or sales (Hall, Scoones, and Tsikata 2017). Land concentration and centralization are archenemies of ‘pro-poor land reforms’.\(^5\) The reactions to these counter agrarian maneuvers are variegated, ranging from resistance to acquiescence (Borras 2009). The period of corporatization of agriculture production is also labeled the corporate food regime, and corporate food producers expand into new territories seeking more opportunities for accumulation (McMichael 2009; Akram-Lodhi 2015; Hall and Cousins 2017). The promotion of large-scale agriculture is based on the view that large-scale production can reduce hunger and poverty. Conspicuously, amidst the high levels of productivity attributed to capitalist agriculture, hunger still persists (Cousins 2013). It is interesting to note that not all the hegemonic tendencies of corporate agriculture are successful. In Africa, lack of political support and facilitative infrastructure often hamper the expansion of corporate agriculture (Hall and Cousins 2017).

In the post-land reform period in Zimbabwe, contract farming has become the most common way of integrating peasant farmers into production chains. The contract schemes are introduced via agribusiness firms, who present to farmers many models (Scoones 2015; Sakata 2016). Resultantly, in the post-2009 era when the economy was dollarized, a ‘tobacco boom’ was recorded (Sachikonye 2016). Furthermore, some studies indicate that in some areas in Zimbabwe, about 90% of rural households embarked on contract farming post-dollarization (James and Kinsey 2013). However, some argue that contract farming is the other side of land grabbing, based on fictitious inclusivity and unmet promises of employment generation; if employment is met, peasants lose their land control in the process (Chambati, Mazwi, and Mberi 2018; Martiniello 2015). Furthermore, peasant farmers are controlled directly by cropping practice or indirectly by debt, and the promised market integration remains perverse (Fairbairn et al. 2014; Scoones et al. 2011). Albeit not a contract scheme, the situation in the enclave (between the peasants and the LSCF) has links with contract farming as the LSCF is contracted to produce fresh crops for European markets as well as barley and wheat for local beer brewery companies; the LSCF also grows some of the tobacco under contract.\(^6\) The contract scheme arrangements are supported by the state and demonstrate an intensified commoditization of agriculture production (Bernstein 1994, 60). An understanding of these evolving webs of

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\(^6\)Interview with LSCF DM 30 June 2018.
capitalism deepens one’s appreciation of the dynamics in an enclave where peasants, who are resource-constrained, exist in juxtaposition with a resource endowed large scale farming system.

**Semi proletarianization**

As capitalism rages, so do precarity and differentiation among the peasantry. The peasantry is differentiated into several strata, the middle, rich, proletarian and semi-proletarian (Moyo 2005). This differentiation fuels land struggles (Moyo 2004). The semi-proletariat engages in some level of agriculture and is multi-occupational (Moyo, Jha, and Yeros 2013; Cousins 2013). The process of semi-proletarianization is universal amidst globalization, and it is more of a coping strategy against marginalization (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017; Fairbairn et al. 2014). In post-land reform Zimbabwe, not only are the land reform beneficiaries semi-proletarians, former LSCF farm workers are also semi-proletariats (Bernstein 2004; Moyo 2011b, 511; Chambati 2013, 2017). Thus, given such precarisation in the countryside, off-farm finance becomes a key source of accumulation from below (Cousins 2013).

In other southern African countries, such as South Africa, the dual characteristic of the labor force is also recorded (Jacobs 2018). The rise of urbanization and proletarianization without corresponding wages for social reproduction has given rise to an ‘urban proletariat with peasant characteristics’ (Jacobs 2018), thus, the foregrounding of semi-proletarianization as the labor force practices peri-urban agriculture to meet its social reproduction needs. A similar tendency is also observable in the study area where some of the peasantry straddles the town and the countryside in efforts to meet their social reproduction needs. In a study in China in a context where peasants lease out land to corporate farming, Zhang and Donaldson (2010) and Zhang (2015) report that landowners became semi-proletarianized but still owned the land. While the capitalist farmers who lease in the land usually have contractual obligations in terms of their agriculture production, the peasant farmers lose their control of the means of production, enter into the labor class and are subject to direct company control. In the process, they have no control over the harvest (Zhang and Donaldson 2010). The observations and arguments by Zhang and Donaldson (2010) and Zhang (2015) aid our understanding of the ensuing dynamics on the three farms, where the land tenure is similar to the Chinese tenure regime. Another interesting perspective on semi-proletarianization is brought up by Zhan and Scully (2018); they argue that semi-proletarianization must be interpreted more in terms of how peasants can hold on to land in the face of spiraling precarity. However, the peasants’ hold to land at times is not a choice of their own, particularly in our study area where land ownership resides in the state. Thus, this study agrees with Zhan and Scully (2018) that land provides livelihood security for semi-proletarians. We also concur with Zhang (2015) and Zhang and Donaldson (2010) that the state’s ownership of land constrains full proletarianization of the peasantry.

In the study area, peasant farming co-exists with LSCF; to broaden our understanding of this phenomenon, Karl Kautsky’s arguments are pertinent. Kautsky argued that the peasantry would not be land dispossessed because the peasant farms would be production sites for labor power required by agriculture and industry (Kautsky 1988). It is further argued that small independent farms have ‘plentiful supply of able-bodied labor’
This article revisits some of Karl Kautsky’s arguments as a way of shedding more light on the trajectory of capitalism in the study area.

**Agrarian politics**

In rural Zimbabwe, the political-military wields much influence, as well as war veterans and the ruling party (Scoones 2015, 199). The state makes use of the party structures and traditional leaders to control communal areas. Overall, this resulted in the lack of ideological clarity on the countryside policy (Moyo and Yeros 2007). However, Scoones (2015) further argues that these actors must not be approached with generalizations; there is the need for nuanced studies on how they interact within specific contexts. Blurred lines exist between the state and the ruling party (Alexander 2018). These blurred lines are also evident in the case study area as some of the state functionaries are also party elites. Resettlement areas are under the jurisdiction of traditional chiefs; the authority of these chiefs is variegated. In some cases, the chiefs are used by the state to implement policies and partisan projects (Alexander 2018). On the other hand, they also play a balancing role as they protect their political subjects and push ahead state policies however unpopular they are (Mkodzongi 2016). Thus, an analysis of traditional authority hovers over a spectrum of control to cooperation in respective locations. Another critical level of authority in the resettlement areas in Zimbabwe is the committee of seven. These are new centers of power (Mamdani 2009). These committees of seven work in hand in hand with the village leaders. Overall, within capitalism, the character and roles of village leaders are explained by Zhang and Donaldson (2010); they state that traditional leaders provide ‘politically assisted accumulation’ and consolidate land through ‘encouragement, persuasion, and intimidation’.

**The Zimbabwean state**

A state’s primary role is to provide loans, investment and technical assistance to the citizenry (Borras and McKinley 2006). However, in Zimbabwe, this has not been the case. The actions of the state have been variegated with more propensities towards non-provision of the required agrarian resources to the peasantry. The West and international financial institutions imposed economic sanctions on the Zimbabwean state for property rights violations in relation to the land expropriations done via the FTRLP. With the advent of sanctions, the Zimbabwean state was severely constrained; as a result there was limited agrarian finance. The sanctions led the World Bank to increase the risk premium on investment for Zimbabwe from 3.4% in 2000 to 153% in 2004 (Richardson 2006 cited in Musemwa and Mushunje 2011). Therefore, it became difficult to mobilize international capital to invest in Zimbabwe. At the same time, ‘Regional economic cooperation became thwarted’ as international isolation mounted in Zimbabwe (Moyo and Nyoni 2013). Given this scenario, there was the rise of pessimism for land reform beneficiaries (Moyo and Nyoni 2013). Conjecturally, domestic capital became reluctant to invest in agriculture for domestic ‘agrarian capital operates in tandem with international capital’ (Moyo 2011b, 525). Resultantly, the government initiated various support mechanisms; some of the programs are Operation Maguta, The Champion Farmer Program and The Agriculture Sector Productive Enhancement Facility (Pazvakavambwa 2009). However, these were not
adequate to address the situation. The cost of credit became higher and there was the rise of ‘short termism of institutions’ (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012). For instance, interest rates for government loans to farmers were pegged at 25% per annum⁷ and on a short-term repayment period of 6 months. Eventually the input package that the state provided to the farmers shrunk by 50% (Pazvakavambwa 2009). Thus, farmers’ accumulation from below became constrained, as the farmers could not produce enough from the limited inputs. As for those who had accessed credit and failed to repay the loans within the stipulated short time, they were exposed to the prevailing market interest rate of 300% per annum (Pazvakavambwa 2009). More and more farmers fell into a debt trap and this prompted some to seek partnerships with large capital.

The sanctions impacted the state’s budgetary efforts, and the state failed to allocate adequate budgetary resources to agriculture. The farmers relied on savings, which were consistently ‘wiped out’ by the hyperinflation and the farmers were left with limited options; they failed to deposit their earnings into banks (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012, 88). Yet the same bank deposits are instrumental in the generation of loanable funds. The few banks that had financial resources preferred to provide the loans to agro dealers and contracting companies. For instance in 2011, 65% of loans to the agricultural sector were provided to contracting firms and agro dealers (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012). The agro dealers and contracting firms in turn preferred to engage large-scale farmers thereby further disenfranchising the small-scale farmers (Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo 2012). Thus, the sanctions, in summary, led to shortage of budgetary support to the state, made the state to disenfranchise the peasantry, induced the remaining banks to disfranchise the peasantry, led to higher cost of agrarian finance, short term loans and prompted the rise of penetration of capital into the countryside through contract farming, land leasing and land purchases.

As previously indicated, in late 2009 the economy was dollarized; this also increased the number of private firms involved in contract farming (Sachikonye 2016). At the same time, the state was slowly ‘deradicalizing’ as shown by its slow accommodation of joint ventures between the peasantry and capital (c.f. ‘The radicalized state’, Moyo and Yeros 2007). The state shifted its focus to Asia and Brazil for agrarian finance; the finance that was obtained in the form of tractors, fertilizer, irrigation equipment and generators was then redistributed to large A2 farms (Scoones, Murimbarimba, and Mahenehene 2019), despite studies pointing out that the peasantry suffered from low farm mechanization and only accounted for less than 22% of the national tractor fleet ownership (Moyo and Nyoni 2013, 230). This demonstrates how the state has been giving more support to large scale farming at the expense of the peasantry. Thus, we argue, the state has been a tacit driver of the land dispossession. For instance, the state has been providing support to large agro estates and large-scale farmers as a way of ‘shoring up to the west’ that it is able to navigate the sanctions and can strike alliances with capital outside the West’s control (Moyo and Nyoni 2013). Simultaneously, it has been promoting the leasing of huge pieces of land, for instance the leasing of 140,000 ha of land by the government to Custa holdings (Moyo and Nyoni 2013). This occurrence is connected to land dispossession in other parts of Africa, which largely driven by the view that the peasantry is unable to produce enough food, and therefore large-scale farming is the solution to the food crisis

⁷Usually the bank loan interest rate in Zimbabwe is pegged between 3% and 12% per annum.
and shortage of employment for Africa’s rising population (Chambati, Mazwi, and Mberi 2018). Since 2015, the state has also actively taken part in a state-private sector contract farming model (Command Agriculture)\(^8\) that targets the provision of inputs to both large-scale farmers and the peasantry (Mazwi et al. 2019). The new administration (since November 2017) has openly supported the emergence and reinsertion of a bimodal structure by supporting large-scale land investments in the countryside (Mazwi et al. 2018). The state’s support for large-scale agriculture is inherently based on a modernization narrative that largely favors large-scale farming. This can be explained as a narrative undergirded by the history of settler colonialism (Cousins and Scoones 2010). It is within this realm of economic sanctions, limited state agrarian support for the peasantry, the rise of capitalist agriculture, semi-proletarianization and state support for large-scale agriculture that the situation in the study area is interpreted.

**Methodological reflections**

This study focuses on three farms in Ward 23 of Marondera East. Marondera is a farming district located 74 km northeast of the capital, Harare. It is the Provincial Capital of Mashonaland East Province. Ward 23 is located 20 kilometers from Marondera Central Business District. The three farms (Riverside, Spring Valley, and Water Head) were allocated to peasants under the A1 model of the FTRLP from 2001 to 2008. The LSCF (Home Park) that dispossesses the peasantry used to be part of a larger Home Park Estates; it was downsized during the land reform. Prior to the FTRLP, Home Park Estates was made up of 7 farms, which included Riverside, Water Head, and Spring Valley; all were located on a 1200 ha piece of land. During the FTRLP, Home Park farm, the LSCF, was downsized to 300 ha and cultivated various cash crops (tobacco, peas, wheat, peaches) on this 300 ha.\(^9\)

From 2003 to date, the LSCF DM\(^10\) has been renting land owned by the peasants on the three aforementioned farms (Riverside, Water Head and Spring Valley) and continuously engaging in land concentration. It is this practice of land reconcentration and the ensuing capitalistic dynamics that this study focuses on. The study covers the period from 2003 to 2018, and its location represents an enclave since the area is surrounded by places that are characterized by peasant accumulation from below; also, many other resettlement areas in Zimbabwe are characterized by peasant accumulation from below. However, in this enclave, immediately after the land reform, there was re-establishment of dualism and stunted accumulation from below, which has persisted to this day. The data for this study were collected from 2015 to 2018. The data were collected from peasant farmers, local leadership, government officials, and the LSCF. The primary data collection methods include in-depth interviews, life histories and participant observations. From January 2015 to December 2017, the authors made frequent visits to this community, and from January 2018 to August 2018, one of the authors lived in this community with the sole purpose of collecting more primary data. A total of 105 households and 15 key informants participated in this study. These households rented out their land to

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\(^8\)For the 2019–2020 farming season the state is mulling halting the program due to challenges such as non-loan repayments by farmers and shortage of forex. However, studies by Mazwi et al. (2019) indicate that in terms of non-loan repayments the large-scale farmers are the largest loan defaulters yet had the highest inputs per capita.

\(^9\)Similarly, the average landholding for an A2 farm is 330 ha (Murisa 2011).

\(^10\)DM pseudo name for the capitalist farm.
the LSCF, became proletarianized to varying degrees, and were ‘virtually’ dispossessed of the means of production at some point between 2003 and the present. The participants of the study were selected through purposive and snowball sampling. Maxwell (1996) highlights that purposive sampling is not about sampling a person only; focus is also given to settings, events, and process. Thus, the focus was given to households involved in land leasing to the LSCF. Purposive sampling is ideal for exploratory research, or in situations where the population under study is specialized or difficult to reach (Maxwell 1996). Sampling under this method ended when the researchers reached a point of thematic saturation, that is, when the interviewees started to give the same responses. As for snowball sampling, the researchers relied on the use of interconnected networks among the research population (Neuman 2014). The links were direct and indirect; using this method, the researchers included peasants who were referred by other peasants as research participants since they also rented out their land. Sampling under this method ended when no new names were provided (see Neuman 2014). The practice of land leasing is hidden and some challenges were experienced at the study’s inception, as some farmers were reluctant to participate in the study; the researchers clearly explained to the community that the information was solely for research purpose and that they were not government officials. The respondents slowly started to participate in the study; in addition, network sampling also enhanced confidence building among the study participants.

**Collectivizing for dispossesseion?**

Whilst the land reform expropriated land from LSCF and led to repeseantization across the country (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Scoones et al. 2012), in the study area, the repeasantization was short-lived. In 2003, the peasants in Riverside, faced with a shortage of resources to embark on independent crop production, devised a plan to improve their livelihoods; they approached the LSCF for support. At the same time, the peasants also practiced, to a limited extent, sharecropping arrangements among themselves. The sharecropping arrangements had become non-rewarding due to the harsh economic situation that resulted in the shortage of resources across most peasants’ households. For the record, during the period 2000–2005, there was homogeneity among the peasants (Moyo et al. 2009). Therefore, land renting to the capitalist LSCF meant that no other land renters were available (c.f. Mamonova 2016). The peasants’ economic position was compounded by the fact that during this period, the national economy was in distress (Moyo and Yeros 2007; Moyo 2013), and the Zimbabwean government was ‘broke’ with no support from the international community (Scoones et al. 2011). In addition, the donor community mainly gave its support to communal areas and shied away from the land reform areas that were highly politicized (Moyo 2011c; Helliker, Chiweshe, and Bhatasara 2018).

A smaller group of peasants from Riverside Farm together with their village leader approached LSCF DM, who previously owned Riverside Farm but had it expropriated during the land reform. They approached the LSCF suggesting that they wanted the LSCF’s assistance to start successful farming. This was the beginning of the first wave of land reconcentration by the LSCF. The agreement was that the peasants were to cede their landholdings to the LSCF, each averaging 6 ha per household, for an unspecified period of time. The LSCF would grow commercial crops and pay about 17% of the net
profit to the land reform beneficiaries. LSCF have superior infrastructure and machinery (Mudhara 2004). Meanwhile, the land reform beneficiaries for their household subsistence would cultivate their 1-acre plots, which are located at their homesteads. In addition, the peasants were supposed to provide unpaid labor to this ‘project’.11 There was ‘virtual dispossession’ of the peasants’ land from 2003 to 2007, as they parceled their landholding to the LSCF.

This form of dispossession was ‘virtual’ in the sense that the peasants still ‘owned’ the land or rather the permits to the land, but they had bequeathed their user rights and in the process become proletarianized (c.f. Mamonova 2016). This form of dispossession is similar to what Levien (2017, 7) reports as dispossession of land rights in situ. In Riverside, the dispossession was characterized by the collectivization of individual rights. The land reform provided peasants with individual rights to 6 ha fields and group rights to grazing area (Moyo et al. 2009). The collectivization of land was achieved because when the peasants approached the LSCF, they were admonished to form a larger group, to enable the mobilization of a larger land parcel, and establish a small committee that would administer the land parcel. Capitalistic farming prefers negotiation with a group since this lowers transaction costs and guarantees easier management of the peasantry (Zhang and Donaldson 2010).

The plots that the LSCF DM was interested in were those that had in place irrigation infrastructure (underground hydrains) and were more accessible by road network to farm machinery. About two plots were excluded due to inaccessibility and lack of irrigation infrastructure; however, all had to benefit since this was a ‘communal’ village arrangement. Therefore, contrary to the popular view that collectivized land tenure systems protect peasants from dispossession (see Mafeje 2003), in this context, collectivization of land leads to speedy and easiest dispossession of land from the peasants. This bolsters the arguments of Kautsky (1988) that private property is a hindrance to centralization. It is a hindrance since it provides landowners with exclusion rights, thereby providing capacity to resist enclosures. At the same, a paradox exists in that private property is also needed by capitalist agriculture for security purposes (Kautsky 1988).

On the gender front, the dispossession impacted more on women as they rarely took part in the public discussions with the LSCF DM. (For a wider discussion on gender effects of dispossession, see Levien 2017). Furthermore, women were excluded from the ‘committee’ that dealt directly with the LSCF. The committee was composed of four men. Women’s exclusion can be explained by the prevalence of patriarchy and a land ownership that is biased in favor of men (Moyo et al. 2009). The committee was not elected by the villagers but was self-appointed after the LSCF had advised that it preferred to interface with a small group of people. The village head led the committee.

The LSCF could not wage full-scale dispossession of land because after the land reform, the ultimate ownership of rural land rests with the state (Zimbabwe Land Commission Act 2018; Moyo 2013). Dispossession was restricted by the existing tenure regime (Hall et al. 2015, 474). The Zimbabwean state did not award the land reform beneficiaries title to the land as a way of discouraging land sales that could lead to destitution (Matondi

11The LSCF adopted the term ‘project’ to refer to the land renting process. The term ‘project’ is popularly known in the locality as an activity that is meant to economically empower a person or household. The ruling party and government also casually use the term to refer to any activity that is meant to empower the citizenry.
However, in as much as land sales did not occur in the study area, the lack of title to the land did not put brakes on the virtual dispossession. The LSCF, which had the ‘bundle of powers’ as shown by its large resource endowments, reaped the benefits of actual access to the land (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

If one considers the fact that in Zimbabwe peasants were historically land dispossessed (Moyo 2011a), this form of dispossession could indicate another wave of dispossession or a new ‘regime of dispossession’ (Levien 2015). Therefore, what the peasants could only do was to bequeath the user rights that they had. So, the LSCF DM for 4 years, 2003–2007, had unlimited access to the peasants’ land and also managed to proletarianize them. Export crops, such as tobacco, peas, baby corn, as well as barley and wheat, for a local national beer brewery company, were grown on the dispossessed fields. The local leadership of this village, the village head and some elites, facilitated this dispossession; they cajoled and coerced those who did not want to cede their land to follow suit in the name of development. The coercion was made through threats of eviction from the land on trumped-up charges of being anti-‘development’ and, therefore, an enemy of the people. Around the year 2007, some of the land reform beneficiaries from this village who had urban jobs decided to withdraw their land from the ‘project’.12 There were intense negotiations between the committee and those who wanted to withdraw their land from the land parcel. Finally, they managed to withdraw their land after they threatened to destroy any crops and physically block the machinery from being deployed on their plots. Those who withdrew their land from the land parcel argued that the project was not beneficial as they were not involved in the sale of the product, and it also required huge labor inputs from the peasantry. The withdrawal from the ‘project’ demonstrates that peasants have agency and also indicates the contestability of dualism in this enclave, however minimal it was.

After the withdrawal of some households from the ‘land parcelling’ in Riverside Farm, the LSCF saw no motive in continuing with production on the reduced land size. Furthermore, the country was nearing political elections in 2008, so it became more and more dangerous for resettled peasants to be seen collaborating with a white LSCF, lest one would be regarded as anti-land reform. The land question in Zimbabwe has a racial connotation (Utete 2003; Moyo 2003; Zamchiya 2011).

Capitalism maintains a spatio-temporal fix. Harvey (2004, 64) highlights that a spatio-temporal fix is a situation where capitalism adopts a solution to a capitalist crisis. Under such circumstances, capital surplus seeks a new territorial division of labor; it opens cheaper resource areas, ‘penetrating pre-existing social formations by capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements’. That is, it tries to cease and accumulate at every given ‘moment’.

Following protracted negotiations13 and disagreements in Riverside Farm, the LSCF dismounted its irrigation equipment and related infrastructure and shifted focus to other farms. The LSCF then started to have similar projects with other peasants in Waterhead and Springvalley Farms, which are located about 3 kilometers from Riverside Farm. The

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12 At the start of the land rent, the agreements made were by word of mouth. Written agreements were made between the LSCF and the collectivization committee; as for the individual peasants, they only sign receipt for receipt of land rentals. Nonetheless, even the signed agreement with the committee is not valid in law because they are not commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands and Rural Resettlement (Mudimu, Ting, and Nalwimba, forthcoming).

13 Some of the peasants wanted the LSCF to continue with the project and the negotiations lasted for more than 3 months.
LSCF easily adjusted in the new sites of surplus-value production, since capitalism is based on the modus operandi of infinite and limitless growth and is used to interruptions (Harvey 2010). From 2009 to date, the land concentration by the LSCF in Spring Valley and Water Head has been ongoing. In the year 2009, an inclusive government was formed; the economy was liberalized, and the state tried to normalize its relations with capitalists (Moyo 2013). This broader context enabled the peasants in the new locations to easily warm up and cooperate with the LSCF, as the political situation became less radicalized and ‘partnerships’ were implicitly more tolerated in the land reform areas by the state and political establishment.

Water Head and Spring Valley are adjacent. The closeness of these farms makes it easier for land centralization by the LSCF. This validates Kautsky’s (1988) hypothesis that expropriated small farms must also constitute an interconnected area. The peasants in these areas are no longer paid a specific percentage of the profit. The payments they are given are discussed in the following section; however, proletarianization is still persistent and so is the collectivization of the land for exploitation by the LSCF, with each minimum renting period lasting for 5 years. In the 5-year period, the LSCF does full-scale commercial production of crops of its choice and uses its own preferred land management practices. Figure 1 illustrates the land dispossession in Riverside [2003–2007], Water Head and Spring Valley Farms [2009–2018].

**Proletarianization**

Labor relations are created by dispossession from the means of production and subsumption into a labor class (Amin 2010; Harvey 2010; Mamonova 2016). From 2003 to 2007, the resettled peasants who had parceled their land to the LSCF provided unpaid labor to the LSCF (on the plots the peasants had rented out). Each household provided the labor power it possessed, so the bigger the household the more labor power it provided to the project. Capitalistic farming strives more when there are several farms that can release an abundant labor supply (Kautsky 1988). The labor force performed mainly menial tasks, ranging from weeding, to guarding the crops, harvesting the baby corn and transporting...
it to the pack shades that are stationed in the LSCF compound (located 1 kilometer away). Families, including children and women, provided this labor. Some young men managed the irrigation system alongside waged permanent laborers of the LSCF. The pretext for the unpaid labor was that the LSCF advised the peasants that this was also ‘their’ project; so, apart from ceding land, they also had to provide labor power to complement the LSCF’s waged labor. The non-payment for the labor power of the peasants confirms the arguments by Gillan Hart (cited in Arrighi 2007) that in Africa, dispossession of the means of production sometimes occurs without corresponding wage employment. As for waged labor, it was mainly sourced from surrounding communal areas, such as Svosve and Machek, though about 20% of the laborers resided in the LSCF compound under a labor tenancy arrangement (on labor tenancy see Scoones et al. 2012; Chambati 2017). The proletarianization of the land reform beneficiaries’ demonstrates the perpetuation of the peasant areas as a source of labor army for the LSCF or for capital valorization (see Chambati 2017; Marx 1976). At the same time, it led to massive immiseration of the peasantry as it made them engage in self-exploitation not for household consumption but for the LSCF’s accumulation. Under functional peasant farming, the peasantry engages in unwaged labor for subsistence purposes (Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 1992).

When the LSCF relocated to Water Head and Spring Valley Farms, it adjusted its labor regime to suit the peasantry that were reluctant to offer unpaid labor in the new location and cede their land to the LSCF. The peasants scrambled to join the LSCF’s waged force. However, not all the peasants managed to secure employment. In the post-land reform period, in enclaves, capitalist farmers still have the advantage in terms of labor power and other means of production (Moyo 2013). Capitalist agriculture accompanied by technology is not able to absorb a large number of workers (Amin 2010). The LSCF deployed center pivots; this, therefore, reduced the number of men who could be part of the irrigation teams. An irrigation team comprises two shifts of varying sizes, from 5 to 10 people depending on the land area to be irrigated.14 On the contrary, a center pivot is electronically controlled and on average may require one security guard at its base station.15 Furthermore, the center pivot applies chemicals; this also limits the labor force needed for spraying with knapsack sprayers. Faced with such a scenario, there were more struggles among the peasantry to be included as workers, typifying the ‘subordinate inclusion’ as reported by Mamonova (2016, 206) in a similar study in Russia. Our findings of the peasantry struggling to be employed by the capitalist land concentrators are in contrast with Zhang and Donaldson’s (2010) findings in China where the villagers used their collective authority to acquire employment guarantees from the capitalistic farming system. Overall, more women were employed than men; women are regarded as more efficient when it comes to reaping crops.16 Furthermore, it is important to note that during land dispossession, there is likely to be a rise in the demand for women’s labor and a fall in women’s control of the labor products (Levien 2017). A number of women managed to secure waged employment with the LSCF, but this did not translate to their improved bargaining power within the LSCF employment arrangements or improved income decisions at the household level. One female informant remarked as follows: ‘I am suffering; the work

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14 Interview with the LSCF and a former irrigation team member on June 2017.
15 Interview with an LSCF employee on 13 February 2018.
16 Interview with a key informant on 10 April 2018.
is too much; we are paid the same as the workers from the compounds; my husband also decides how I use my earnings’. Those who could not secure employment fell into more precarisation as they joined the reserve army and turned into a ‘mob’ in the community without the means of production and jobs (Lee 2017; Marx 1976; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010a). Table 1 highlights the employment patterns in the study area, and it is based on the information of peasants who were willing to be employed by the LSCF.

Table 1. Employment patterns for Spring Valley and Water Head Farms as at August 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed by the LSCF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Data.

Accumulation, differentiation, and social reproduction

The accumulation landscape is non-linear. Some groups accumulate material and non-material goods (Tsikata 2015). Overall, it is labor power that gives birth to surplus value, ‘bathed in the fire of labor’ (Marx 1976). The LSCF accumulated by the valorization of the labor power of the peasants. Furthermore, the LSCF’s huge resource endowments were the results of the LSCF having export markets and access to financial resources from top tier institutions within and outside the country; these were not accessible to the peasantry due to the requirement of collateral security. A key informant also revealed that the LSCF was in partnership with other former LSCFs. While some of the peasants could not be employed due to increased mechanization in production from 2009, there was maximum exploitation of the employed peasants through increased amount of work. The presence of the reserve army created the necessary conditions for labor intensification without a corresponding rise in wages. Those who managed to get employment did not complain much because they feared losing their jobs and getting replaced easily. Retrenchment is the most powerful threat to workers (Lee 2017). Such an arrangement of work intensification can lead to a lowering of the production cost and sustained accumulation by large-scale farming (see Kautsky 1988). During the same period, the LSCF expanded its production area, established a state of the art pack shed that could handle more fresh produce for export to Europe and also invested heavily in farm mechanization. In addition, the accumulation by the LSCF was enhanced by the fact that the government gazetted wages for farm laborers during that period was US$33; this constituted only 10% of the breadbasket requirements for a family of 4 based on the prevailing circumstance at that time. The lower than average price of labor power makes it conducive for capitalism to reign (Kautsky 1988). The promulgation of below-poverty-line wages for the agriculture workers indicates that the state is, as argued by Ching Kwan Lee (2018), supportive of capital, and this exacerbates relational struggles that cause precarity.

17 Interview with the LSCF on how they were able to mobilize funding, July 2018.
18 In our interview, the LSCF confirmed only hiring other LSCF as specialist managers and not as partners.
19 Our interviews indicate that more than 20 tractors and related equipment were procured by the LSCF between 2003 and 2015.
The LSCF grew crops that were exported to foreign markets, such as baby corn. Other crops such as tobacco and wheat were sold in the local market. Peasants were paid the cash equivalent of 1 tobacco bale (US$500) per ha, and on average, each ha produces about 25 bales of tobacco. The payment mode had changed from 17% of profit to $500, but the modus operandi remained the same: the peasant farmers and their committees were still secluded from tobacco marketing arrangements. Such arrangements were exclusively handled by the LSCF.

In the post-land reform period, capitalism is adopting new tactics to match a new agrarian structure that is numerically dominated by peasants (Moyo and Nyoni 2013, 196). At times, the LSCF achieved accumulation through unorthodox means. For example, regarding the 17% of profit earnings that were supposed to be paid to the peasants in the period 2003–2007, it is noteworthy that the peasants were not aware of the actual earnings from the crop sales, costs of production and other associated costs. One key informant remarked: ‘We don’t go to the markets; we have never seen the sales sheets’. It is such non-disclosure of the actual earnings that made some peasants allege that they were cheated by the LSCF. As typical of capitalism, in this enclave, there is profiteering by the minority (Amin 2010). Whilst the LSCF accumulated, on the other hand, there was wide disaccumulation among majority of the peasantry. However, the local elites, particularly the villages heads, political party elites, and the ‘collectivization committees’, accumulated by combining ‘personal demands and official ones’ both from the peasantry and the LSCF (Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 1992; Mamdani 1996).

The village leaders in all the three farms demanded from the LSCF that their homestead fields (1 acre) be connected to an irrigation system that was to be functional all-year round, and the LSCF complied. In addition, the committees and party leaders were regularly provided with other resources, such as free land tillage, fuel, and fertilizers for their homestead fields. To the peasantry, the elites made it mandatory that when it came to benefits sharing, the leaders were paid more than the villagers. In the process, the elites in these three villages managed to accumulate various resources, such as brick houses under zinc sheets, livestock, vehicles and scotch carts. As for peasants who had been dispossessed, the majority accumulated non-productive assets, such as radios and solar panels, whilst others managed to invest in social reproduction by paying the dowry for marriages, school fees for their children and daily sustenance. But, by and large, a few of the dispossessed peasants managed to accumulate enough productive assets from both the dispossession and waged employment to embark on successful independent crop production. As for those with off-farm sources of income (urban jobs) and those who withdrew from the project, some started to accumulate by growing tobacco, which is also cultivated by the LSCF; others embarked on tomato and vegetable cultivation. The group with urban jobs accumulated more productive assets from independent crop production on their 6 ha. Our interviews reveal that peasants with urban jobs managed to achieve harvests of an average of 4.7 tonnes per ha for maize, and tobacco averaging 15 bales per ha.21 The higher incomes from urban jobs provided the capital for accumulation and also shaped class differentiation (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010a; Zhang 2015). At the same time, straddling rural-urban livelihoods indicate the semi-

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20 Interview with the peasants on 10 March 2018.
21 Tobacco bale size ranges from 90 to 110 kg.
proletarianization of the peasantry. Table 2 below illustrates the classes that are emerging in this enclave.

The poor peasant group is composed of the peasantry that have lost their land and do not have 1-acre plots and those who are unemployed but have the 1-acre homesteads. The poor barely have enough resources apart from the one-off rent that they receive from the LSCF, which is not enough as previously discussed. The semi-proletariat is constituted of those who secured employment with the LSCF and some who secured employment in urban areas. However, there is an overlap between this group and the middle peasant. The middle peasant is composed of the collectivization committee members and some villagers with urban jobs; some of these households hire labor but also rely on their own household labor. This group is also made up of peasants who are not land dispossessed, such as Mr. James. The rich peasants are mainly the political elites, the land collectivization committee members and some with urban linkages. This group employs other peasants, and they have access to irrigation equipment and mechanized tillage services. The last group is the land concentrator; the LSCF employs more than 300 permanent workers plus some casual workers drawn from the land reform beneficiaries and surrounding resettlement and communal area. It engages in land concentration, large capitalistic scale farming, and supplies its produce both to the domestic and foreign markets.

### Social reproduction

Labor needs to be reproduced daily and generationally (Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 1992). The peasants succumbed to a number of forces as they strived to reproduce. The peasantry in the three farms faced a ‘reproductive squeeze’ (Bernstein 1977; Kay 2009), as they were limited off-farm jobs and low farm production levels due to limited land access. In Zimbabwe, from the turn of the twenty-first century, there has been much deindustrialization, informalization, and feminization of poverty (Helliker, Chiweshe, and Bhatasara 2018). Some scholars reported that between 1998 and 2011, Foreign Direct Investments into the

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**Table 2. Emerging classes in the enclave.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emerging classes</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semi Proletariat (Under Land Dispossession)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waged labor with 1-acre homestead</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waged labor without 1-acre homestead</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Peasants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed without 1-acre homestead</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed with 1-acre homestead</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Peasants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not dispossessed, own crop production, with urban employment plus resistors, some members of the collectivization committees</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich Peasants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village leaders, collectivization committees and some with urban jobs.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large scale capitalist farmer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The emerging classes ranking is made on the basis of source of labor, land size, capitalization, source of income and crop production orientation (own consumption vs. market) (Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 1992; Moyo 2011b; Scoones et al. 2012).

Source: Field Data
country plummeted by 99% (Musemwa and Mushunje 2011). As a result, some peasants started to engage in petty commodity trading, fishing and doing other menial jobs, particularly those households with urban jobs. Straddling livelihoods remains central to peasant farmers in rural areas (Mafeje 2003; Akram-Lodhi 2007b; Mkodzongi 2013; Pilossof 2014).

Unlike households in Riverside farm, some households in Water Head and Spring Valley do not have the 1-acre homestead land area. Their homesteads are located within their 6 ha plots. The households without the 1-acre homestead faced severe food shortages; they approached the LSCF, and after intense discussions, the LSCF altered the payment package from only cash payment of $500 per ha per year to include 8 bags of maize (grain), so that the peasants could address their food shortages. The protracted negotiations over the payment mode demonstrate that peasants struggle to ‘re-negotiate terms of incorporation’ when it comes to engaging with capitalists (Hall et al. 2015). The provision of grain to cushion the households demonstrates how capitalists invest in the social reproduction of labor for future valorization (see Chambati 2011; Mamonova 2016). The food shortages resulted in some households engaging in under-consumption, thereby subsidizing the LSCF costs (Chambati 2011). The peasantry reduced the quantity of food they had per meal and some faced a shortage of basic items, such as cooking oil. Furthermore, the peasants’ precarity was worsened by the fact that the payment for land dispossession is made in full at the start of the cropping year; as such, peasants have to survive on the one-off payment for the remaining 11 months of the year, which is not feasible in a national economy characterized by hyperinflation. As a result, there was a rise in indebtedness among the dispossessed peasants (on farmer indebtedness see Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010a; Mcmichael 2013). Furthermore, as previously highlighted, they could not access other sources of agrarian finance to embark on auto crop production. The peasants were indebted to other richer peasants in the locality and also to the LSCF as they regularly approached the LSCF for ‘advances’ to cushion their precarity.23

While the state provided some support in the form of inputs to the peasantry in the three farms, the peasants reported that the support was barely enough, and was delayed at times; the few inputs were supplied well after the farming season had commenced.

**Agrarian politics**

Rural areas are sites of political and economic struggles (Scoones et al. 2012). Majority of times, the struggles center on land control (Yeros 2012, Levien, Watts, and Hairong 2018). Politically, there are numerous dynamics that are unfolding in this enclave. First, the struggle pitted the peasant farmers on one side against the LSCF and village leaders (state) on the other side. The village leaders allied with the LSCF because it was an opportunity for them to engage in rent-seeking activities (see Akram-Lodhi 2004). The village leaders cajoled, coerced and threatened to evict from the land some community members who did not wish to take part in the land collectivization. While Moyo (2011c) reported that the FTRLRP challenged the powers of the LSCF in most of the resettlement

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22 Maize is the staple in Zimbabwe; nationally, 70% of the households grow maize (Moyo 2013).

23 Interview with the LSCF on July 2018.
areas and that the powers of war veterans have been replaced, in this enclave, the LSCF still wields power, and the war veterans did not disappear; they simply metamorphosed into the traditional leaders. In this community, the three village leaders are all war veterans. In these three communities, like in most other resettlement and communal areas, political participation is limited, and local government structures are composed of village committees that are not democratically chosen (Murisa 2009; Cousins, Weiner, and Amin 1992). The authoritarian village leadership, as discussed below, shows some tendency of decentralized despotism (Mamdani 1996, 37).

Our findings reveal that there was more political mobilization, which was often equated to participation. That is, the leadership usually summoned the peasants to listen to announcements on some programs with limited input from the peasantry into the design and implementation of such programs. While there is no doubt that the ruling party, Zimbabwe National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), is active in the resettlement areas, in this enclave, two of the 3 village leaders are the ruling party’s senior officials; thus, there is blurring of roles between traditional authority and political party business. Our findings on the despotic tendency of the traditional leadership in post-land reform Zimbabwe is in contrast with the findings by Mkodzongi (2016), which indicate that traditional leaders protected their subjects against the state and fought for them to have greater inclusion and to benefit from resource extraction in their communities. Thus, while we agree with Mkodzongi that traditional leadership moves along a spectrum of cooperation and oppression, we argue that in contexts, where the traditional leadership derives most of the legitimacy from the top, there is a very high tendency of despotism and limited accountability to the grassroots (on legitimacy, see Ribot 2004).

Indeed, as Marx (1976) remarked, new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society. There was also resistance to the land collectivization by some peasants. A case in point is what we term ‘pivot politics’. One of the peasant farmers, Mr. James, whose field was strategically located, refused to join the land collectivization and also refused to have the center pivot mounted in his field. This resulted in the shelving of the cultivation of other adjacent fields, and it also put brakes to the land dispossession for one farming season. The local leadership threatened the peasant farmer but he kept on resisting and he eventually triumphed. The LSCF had to import more equipment and circumnavigated Mr. James’ piece of land. The resistance by Mr. James has become a symbol of hope for other peasant farmers who are struggling to resist collectivization. This also demonstrates that rural people have aspirations and agency (Mamonova 2016; Long 2001).

The enclave also witnessed a rise in land demand and land conflicts. Some government officials from the provincial capital town of Marondera who were aware of the land collectivization by LSCF also engaged the village heads to get pieces of land in these communities and get involved with the LSCF. Though this has not materialized yet, the new land seekers tried to downsize some fields belonging to the peasantry. They faced resistance from the peasantry. The resistance included direct confrontation between the peasantry and the government officials. The peasantry as a self-defense mechanism also invoked witchcraft threats.

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24Interviews with the village leaders and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA).
In as much as the land is parceled out as a collective entity to the LSCF, there are more ‘concerns of personal gain than communal gains’ (Mamonova 2016). There were struggles among the peasantry over land boundaries as the size of one’s land determined how much one benefited from the land renting. Socially, the land dispossession has caused disharmony. In a particular incident, some tobacco was stolen from the LSCF fields, and the LSCF alleged that the unknown thieves could be relations of the local peasants; therefore, the peasants could have benefitted from the stolen tobacco. The LSCF deducted the costs of the stolen tobacco from the peasant farmers’ land rentals. This form of ‘relational repression’ (Deng and O’Brien 2013) led to further antagonism, with peasants on one side and the traditional leadership and LSCF on the other side. Other struggles against the LSCF were over unfulfilled promises. The LSCF promised to build a bridge across one of the small rivers and also provide some irrigation equipment to the peasants, but this did not materialize. This led to further polarization between the peasant farmers and the LSCF, but this has not halted the land concentration by the LSCF. The land concentration by capitalists is likely to open up avenues for more land struggles (Moyo 2011a).

Coexistence? Revisiting Kautsky

While there is no doubt that there is a strong relationship between peasants and large-scale farming (Sachikonye 2016), the question that confronts us is this: Is there coexistence and how does such coexistence unfold? Kautsky (1988) on the agrarian question argued that the peasantry would not be dispossessed because it is a ‘production site for the labor power’. This partly explains the reality in the enclave. Kautsky’s argument falls short when co-existence is possible due to the land tenure system. The policy of state ownership of land prevented the full-scale dispossession of the peasantry. The land tenure regime as previously highlighted only provides user rights to the peasantry; as such, they could not fully parcel the land to the LSCF. Secondly, the heterogeneity of the peasantry resulted in some peasants resisting the dispossession. Thus, some peasants have agency, which they exercise as they wage their struggles against capitalist exploitation.

Thirdly, Kautsky (1988) posited that coexistence is possible because the small farmer is not a competitor and does not produce products sold by the larger farmer. Similarly, De Schutter (2011) (cited in Mamonova 2016) indicated that coexistence is possible if the markets served by capitalist farmers are segmented from the markets served by the peasants. Contrarily, in this enclave, peasants who withdrew from land dispossession co-exist with the capitalist farmer by cultivating the same tobacco as the capitalist farm and supplying to the same market. Therefore, we argue that coexistence is also possible if the peasantry grows the same crop as the capitalist and has access to the same market. Lastly, Kautsky (1988) argued that there would be subsumption without separation from the means of production. In this enclave, there is subsumption with separation from the means of production, albeit partial separation.

However, as Kautsky argued, the peasantry exists to subsidize capitalist agriculture by producing in abundance the labor power ‘product’ badly required by the capitalist farmer. It has been demonstrated in this enclave that, indeed, peasant farming subsidizes capitalist agriculture through various means, such as under consumption, labor provision and collectivizing its prime land for dispossession. The state indirectly and directly perpetuates this dualism. Directly, the state’s limited support to the land
reform beneficiaries has exposed them to ‘deep-seated challenges’, and propelled resettled peasants to engage in land renting and subsequent dispossession and proletarianization. The relentless support of village heads who are local government functionaries and the leadership of the land collectivization enabled the sustenance of the co-existence of the peasantry and capitalist farming since 2003. Indirectly, the Zimbabwean state has been warming up to capitalist farming, as shown by various policy pronouncements that emphasize a productivist discourse that is based on a ‘neoliberal agriculture export bias’ for both capitalist and peasant farmers (Mazwi et al. 2018; Murisa 2011; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010b; Zhang 2015). The state has been advocating for joint ventures between peasant farmers and capitalist farmers (see Statutory Instrument (SI) 53 of 2014; Moyo 2013, 68). However, we argue that in the enclave, the terms of engagement between the peasant and LSCF do not resemble a joint venture, as shown by the land centralization by the LSCF and proletarianization of the peasantry whilst the LSCF largely accumulates.

**Concluding remarks**

This article illustrated how capitalism proceeds in a post-land reform location that is still dominated by capitalist farming. The article demonstrated that land reform is not sufficient but a major step towards rural development (Kay 2009; Moyo 2003). Limited state support and underperforming of the national economy led peasant farmers to be incorporated into capitalist enclosures, sometimes not on favorable terms. This illustrates the non-linearity of agrarian transformation under neo-liberalism (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Moyo and Nyoni 2013). Faced with livelihoods precarity, peasants collectivized their land and parceled it to a capitalist farming system, leading to the dispossession of the peasantry and subsequent proletarianization. At the same time, the capitalist farming could not absorb into wage employment all the peasantry. This increased the reserve army of labor and exacerbated the precariousness, which became an inbuilt exploitation mechanism of the waged labor.

In the enclave, the peasantry subsidized capitalist farming in a number of ways, such as providing unpaid labor at times and growing crops for social reproduction on their remaining 1-acre plots. The co-existence of peasant farming and capitalist farming is also brought under the spotlight. The peasantry was virtually dispossessed but not displaced due to the prevailing land tenure system that puts the ownership of the land in the hands of the state; some peasants exhibited agency as they resisted and withdrew from the land concentration process. Contrary to orthodox views that co-existence is possible when the markets for the peasants and the capitalized farming are segmented, the coexistence in this enclave is made possible by the fact that some of the peasants are able to grow the same crops as the capitalist farmer and supply the same market. Antagonism is the heart of capitalism. There are political struggles for land control, boundary disputes, and relational repression as the capitalist farming system strives for more land concentration, prompting some peasants to engage in strategic resistance. The role of the land governance system is also questioned as local state functionaries ally with capital and exacerbate land dispossession. At the heart of the struggle for land is the struggle for livelihoods by the peasantry. Therefore, this prompts a call for states to prioritize peasant farming in their national development. Therefore, the pertinent issue
confronting future studies on agrarian change in Zimbabwe is how the peasantry can accumulate from below in a neoliberal context characterized by the reinsertion of dualism and the peasantry’s land dispossession.

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